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Abstract—  This  article  intends  to  present  a  very 
detailed  analysis  of  the  trade-related  aspects  of 
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) negotiations. 
We use a dynamic partial equilibrium model – focusing 
on the demand side – at the HS6 level (covering 5,113 
HS6  products).  Two  alternative  lists  of  sensitive 
products  are  constructed,  one  giving  priority  to  the 
agricultural sectors, the other focusing on tariff revenue 
preservation.  In  order  to  be  WTO  compatible,  EPAs 
must  translate  into  90  percent  of  bilateral  trade  fully 
liberalised. We use this criterion to simulate EPAs for 
each negotiating regional block. ACP exports to the EU 
are forecast to be 10 percent higher with the EPAs than 
under the GSP/EBA option. On average ACP countries 
are forecast to lose 70 percent of tariff revenues on EU 
imports in the long run. Yet imports from other regions 
of  the  world  will  continue  to  provide  tariff  revenues. 
Thus when tariff revenue losses are computed on total 
ACP imports, losses are limited to 26 percent on average 
in the long run and even 19 percent when the product 
lists  are  optimised.  The  final  impact  on  the  economy 
depends  on  the  importance  of  tariffs  in  government 
revenue and on potential compensatory effects. However 
this long term and less visible effect will mainly depend 
on the capacity of each ACP country to reorganise its 
fiscal base. 
Keywords—  Preferential  Trade  Agreements,  Africa, 
EPAs, Partial Equilibrium Simulations. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
This  article  addresses  the  impacts  of  the  non-
reciprocal tariff concessions granted by the EU to the 
ACP  that  had  to  be  replaced  by  new  –  WTO 
compatible – preferential agreements. 
The  negotiations  on  Economic  Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs), between the EU and a number of 
ACP  negotiation  groups  were  scheduled  to  be 
concluded by 31 December 2007. During 2007 seven 
Interim Agreements and a Caribbean EPA have been 
negotiated.  All  establish  free  trade  areas  for  goods 
between the EU and various ACP countries that are 
compatible  with  the  provisions  of  GATT  Article 
XXIV  and,  in  the  case  of  the  Caribbean  EPA,  a 
services agreement compatible with the provisions of 
GATS article V. In total 35 of the 77 ACP countries 
have concluded negotiations on Interim Agreements or 
an  EPA  with  the  EU:  9  LDCs  and  26  non-LDCs. 
Among the remaining ACP countries 32 LDCs benefit 
from duty and quota free access to the EU under the 
GSP ―Everything But Arms‖ arrangement and 10 non-
LDCs are eligible for the standard GSP. Negotiations 
will  continue  in  2008  towards  full  regional  EPAs 
including a full range of trade in goods, services and 
trade related areas to replace the Interim Agreements. 
For  the  agreements  to  be  WTO  compatible  they 
needed  to  include  reciprocal  market  access  which 
covers  ―substantially  all‖  trade.
1  However,  this 
reciprocity is not the only objective of EPAs, which 
include  several  other  elements,  such  as  support  for 
deep  integration  and  development  assistance. 
Moreover  it  was  hoped  that  these agreements  could 
also  promote  regional  integration  among  sub-groups 
of  ACP  countries.  ACP  negotiating  groups  are  a 
combination  of  relatively  poor  developing  countries 
and LDCs, most of which are highly dependent on the 
trade relationship with the EU. This dependence is a 
central aspect when considering the potential losses in 
import  taxes  that  EPAs  may  engender  and  the 
potential  negative  impacts  of  any  deterioration  in 
market access should EPAs not be concluded. 
In many ACP countries a key fear is of significant 
tariff  revenue  losses,  which  often  constitute  a 
                                                            
1This  quantitative  requirement  (90  per  cent  of  free  trade)  is 
achieved  considering  both  90  per  cent  of  bilateral  trade  in 
volume and 90 per cent of tariff lines in the Harmonised System.   2 
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significant  amount  of  government  budgetary 
resources. Given the narrow fiscal basis of many ACP 
countries, a loss of tariff income would translate into 
public budget constraints. However, these effects will 
not  be  immediate.  Tariff  losses  will  be  dampened 
temporarily during the period of progressive phasing 
out of tariffs on EU imports. In the long run, the final 
outcome  in  terms  of  public  budgets  will  mainly 
depend on the capacity of the ACP to reorganise their 
fiscal base, shifting to other forms of taxation, and to 
increase their tax collection capacities. 
Looking at the nature of trade relations between the 
EU and the ACP, it is clear that far more is at stake in 
these  negotiations  for  the  ACP  than  for  the  EU. 
Disparities  in  trade  are  significant.  Despite  the 
preferences  accorded  by  the  EU  during  their 
longstanding partnership, less than 2.5 percent of EU 
imports come from the ACP region, with West Africa 
accounting for half of this. In contrast, ACP countries 
are  highly  dependent  on  trade  relation  with  the  EU 
(nearly 30 percent of their export go to the EU and 28 
percent of their imports come from there,
2 even if the 
trend shows that the weight of the EU is tending to 
diminish  at  the  profit  of  new  trading  partners, 
particularly China. Still this dependence is a central 
issue when considering the potential impacts of EPAs 
on import tax income.  
Moreover  ACP  economies  are  often  very 
specialised. On the export side, one single product (out 
of  the  5,000  products  in  the  HS6  classification) 
accounts for more than 50% of total exports in one 
country over two, and more than 70% in o ne country 
over three. This concentration makes these countries 
particularly sensitive to changes in the world market 
for one or more of these products; for agriculture other 
non economic factors such as weather or disease also 
affect the market, making pr ices very volatile. It is 
clear that, to reduce the vulnerability of the ACP 
economies, a more efficient use of their resources is 
not enough; it is their capacity to diversify that has to 
                                                            
4It is important to keep in mind the high level of heterogeneity that 
exists,  not  only  among  the  different  regional  groups,  but  also 
within them. There are countries, such as Cameroon, for which the 
EU is as essential trading partner (71.7 per cent of exports and 
61.2 per cent of imports), while as for countries in the Caribbean 
and Pacific areas, for which the EU is a more marginal trading 
partner, mainly because of geographical distance. 
be supported. This is one important reason why broad 
market access is vital to supporting economic growth. 
There are several standard methodologies that can 
be  used  to  assess  the  impact  of  trade  policies, 
including  computable  general  equilibrium  (CGE 
models)  and  partial  equilibrium  (PE)  simulation 
models. General equilibrium models are certainly the 
most appropriate to try to assess the overall trade and 
welfare  effects  of  such  agreements.  However  they 
require  social  accounting  matrices  for  the  affected 
countries,  with  comprehensive  information  on  each 
economy involved and their results are driven by the 
quality of these data. Since these data are not available 
for most ACP countries, CGE modelling was not an 
option for this ACP-wide analysis. 
Moreover,  due  to  the  high  level  of  product 
specialisation  of  numerous  ACP  countries,  using  a 
CGE  model  describing  the  whole  economy  at  an 
aggregated level (even at the GTAP sector level) risks 
missing key impacts. Last but not least, working at the 
product  level  is  crucial  from  the  point  of  view  of 
policy relevance because of the problematic issue of 
the need to select ‗sensitive products‘ which will be 
excluded  from  liberalisation.  For  these  reasons,  we 
have  decided  to  use  a  partial  equilibrium  model, 
expressly built for this purpose. 
In  order  to  take  account  of  the  difference  in  the 
level  of  development  between  the  two  regions,  we 
give  a  central  place  to  the  hypothesis  that  local  or 
regional  products  are  different  from  European 
products and thus less substitutable. In assessing the 
results it is also important to remember that the model 
relies  on  an  assumption  of  infinite  supply  capacity, 
although  in  reality  ACP  countries  have  limited 
production  capacities  to  resist  international 
competition. This means that our figures have to be 
interpreted only as ‗potential‘ gains. 
Given the complexity of the EPAs, the study cannot 
include all issues that were at stake in the negotiations. 
The main focus is on trade and budgetary aspects. In 
particular, the paper deals with the major role that the 
choice of sensitive products may play in this sense. 
In order to work on this, we use detailed protection 
data,  taken  from  the  last  version  of  the  MAcMap 
database  updated  for  this  study  with  data  on 
GSP/GSP+  protection  levels.  The  ad-valorem 
equivalents of the bilateral protection levels and of the   3 
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consolidated  tariffs  are  taken  into  account  at  the  6-
digit  level  of  the  harmonized  nomenclature  (HS6). 
Given the uneven level of achievement of agreements 
signed  so  far,  a  number  of  simulations  are  also 
performed in order to identify the impacts of possible 
alternative  policy  options  to  EPAs.  Though  the 
different  computations  are  made  at  the  level  of 
national economies and at the HS6 level, the results 
will  be  presented  at  the  level  of  ACP  negotiating 
regions and aggregated sectors. It is important to bear 
in mind that the regions are characterised by strong 
heterogeneity  between  and  within  themselves.  One 
key difference is the number of LDC countries within 
each group, which is important to the potential impact 
of possible alternatives should EPAs not be signed. 
The paper is structured as follows. After reviewing 
the  literature,  section  three  focuses  on  the  initial 
protection  and  discusses  the  detailed  features  of 
market access in the EPAs. Then, in the fourth section 
we describe the model and the data used. Finally, the 
results  of  the  EPAs  simulations  are  presented  and 
discussed. 
II. LITTERATURE REVIEW 
General  equilibrium  models  are  certainly  more 
appropriate  tools  to  assess  the  overall  trade  and 
welfare  effects  of  such  agreements.  However,  as 
indicated above, they  lack  detail  on  a  sectoral level 
(they  use  GTAP  sectoral  disaggregation  while 
numerous ACP countries are highly specialized in a 
few products) and on ACP regions (social accounting 
matrixes are  only  available  for  a limited number  of 
individual ACP countries). For these reasons, a few 
studies have, like our study, employed a PE model. 
Both  types  of  approaches  tend  to  ignore  the 
adjustment  costs faced  by  an  economy.  Those  costs 
emerge from the reallocation of factors of production 
across sectors, or the reorganization of the fiscal base, 
shifting to other forms of taxation to replace tariffs. 
Moreover,  they  both  assume  that  tariff  cuts  will 
translate into proportional reductions in prices which 
benefit the final consumer. In reality it is likely that 
some of the cut will be appropriated by the producers/ 
importers,  and/or  by  the  exporter  (EU)  due  to  an 
incomplete pass-through of tariff changes to consumer 
prices (see Gasiorek & Winters, 2004 [4]). 
In  addition  to  such  technical  difficulties  with  the 
models,  different  trade  scenarios  often  do  not 
incorporate  important  aspects  of  the  EPAs 
negotiations,  such as the consequences  of  excluding 
specific products from tariff liberalization on the ACP 
side, and the use of different methods to select them. 
Including  these  ―sensitive‖  products  in  the  analysis 
can  significantly  change  results.  Obviously,  to 
introduce  this  important  aspect  effectively,  it  is 
necessary  to  work  at  the  most  disaggregated  level 
(HS6 product level). 
Finally to understand the results, it is important to 
be aware of the assumptions that have been made in 
each study in the design of trade simulations. In this 
respect  many  studies  erroneously  compare  EPA 
negotiations  to  the  status-quo  (Cotonou-Lomé).  In 
reality in the absence of EPAs, ACP countries would 
revert to the situation of other developing economies 
in the WTO: the Generalised System of Preferences 
(GSP) (or, potentially, GSP+, a more generous system 
which is available for a limited number of developed 
countries) and EBA for LDCs. 
Overall, the literature based on partial equilibrium 
models, tends to show that European exporters are the 
main beneficiaries of the EPAs, as their sales to the 
ACP  markets  increase  substantially  after  the 
implementation of these agreements. Implementation 
pushes the prices of imports from Europe down, thus 
reducing the imports from non-EU countries. At the 
same time the welfare of ACP consumers is increased 
due to a reduction in prices. In some cases, however, 
whenever  less  efficient  EU  producers  replace  more 
efficient non-European producers, this type of import 
substitution is associated with a relative loss of overall 
economic efficiency. 
The  United  Nation  Economic  Commission  for 
Africa  (UNECA,  2005)  has  provided  an  exhaustive 
assessment  of  the  effect  of  EPAs  on  African 
economies, based on the SMART partial equilibrium 
model. The study forecasts that European firms could 
increase their exports by more than 20 percent, while 
imports  from  third  markets  would  fall,  partly  as  a 
result. In the meantime, consumer welfare is forecast 
to  increase  by  USD  509  million,  with  fiscal  losses 
amounting  to  USD  1,972  millions.  These  results 
concur  with  the  conclusions  of  other  studies,  for 
example  Busse  et  al.  (2004)[1]  looking  only  at  the   4 
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ECOWAS  regional  economic  community,  the 
Secretariat (2003) [12] for the COMESA sub-region, 
Ndlela  &  Tekere  (2003)[9]  for  SADC  and  Scollay 
(2002) [11] for the Pacific. 
Milner  et  al.  (2005)[8]  provide  an  innovative 
analysis of the decomposition of welfare effects in a 
PE framework. Their approach is rather different from 
previous studies. Along with trade creation and trade 
diversion,  they  also  explicitly  model  the  resulting 
consumption effects. The net welfare effects vary from 
sector to sector, depending on the competitiveness of 
imports from the EU compared to the rest of the world 
and compared to regional production. The method is 
applied to an EAC (East African Cooperation: Kenya, 
Tanzania,  and  Uganda)-EU  EPA  as  an  illustration, 
with estimates of the effects on Tanzania and Uganda. 
The  analysis  suggests  that  the  welfare  effects 
(excluding  revenue  effects)  from  a  reciprocal 
agreement with the EU will be small whether positive 
(for  Uganda)  or  negative  (for  Tanzania).  However 
ACP countries are forecast to have large adjustment 
costs, especially due to tariff revenue losses. 
Results  presented  so  far  do  not  take  into 
consideration  the  impact  of  the  terms  of  trade  or 
structural  changes  on  the  output  of  ACP  countries. 
They also do not indicate the ‗second order effects‘ as 
trade  shifts  to  third  markets  or  endowments  are 
reallocated.  General  Equilibrium  Modelling  gives 
information on these issues. Using the GTAP model 
and database (version 6.0), Keck & Piermartini (2007) 
[6] try to estimate the impact of EPAs on the SADC 
sub-region.  The  authors  find  that  after  the 
implementation of a fully reciprocal EPA, the welfare 
of  the  SADC  sub-region  would  grow  by  USD  1.5 
billion, due in part to the improvement in their terms 
of trade. For some SADC countries, in order to reap 
the full benefits, it is crucial to seek further integration 
between  SADC  countries,  in  parallel  to  EPAs. 
However the paper focuses only on SADC and more 
importantly it does not explore alternatives to EPAs. 
Perez  (2007)  [10]  and  Bouet  et  ali  [2]  tries  to 
investigate whether EPAs are the first best optimum 
for ACP countries compared to other main alternatives 
under a general equilibrium framework (GTAP model 
and MIRAGE model). According to their simulations, 
switching from the Cotonou preferences to the GSP 
and EBA would be less costly than adopting EPAs but 
results differ by regions. In particular, SADC countries 
can  gain  significantly  to  the  EPAs.  The  author also 
investigates the ―GSP+‖ option as well as other WTO 
compatible solutions.  
In our study we stick to a partial equilibrium model, 
the advantaged and disadvantages of which have been 
extensively  discussed  above.  Our  analysis  aims  to 
improve on previous studies in several ways: 
The partial equilibrium model has been designed to 
allow  for  a  very  detailed  evaluation  (at  the  HS6 
headings) of the EPA negotiations and the alternatives 
to them. Consequently very detailed data is used, both 
for trade and protection. We accurately deal with the 
possibility  of  excluding  some  products  from 
liberalisation  by  ACP  countries.  Different  selection 
methods  are  considered,  to  see  whether  or  not  the 
approach to selection makes a difference. The issue of 
the products currently covered by special protocols is 
also  taken  into  account.  Finally  for  some  specific 
products  a  capacity  constraint  has  also  been 
implemented. 
Contrarily to other PE approaches, we do not rely 
on the perfect import substitutability  hypothesis. On 
the  contrary  we  introduce  a  horizontal  and  vertical 
differentiation between products. 
Different scenarios are simulated in order to assess 
the  impact  of  both  the  EPAs  negotiations  and 
alternatives  to  them.  When  assessing  the  impact  of 
EPAs  we  use  as  the  counterfactual  the  GSP/EBA 
combination  of  market  access,  instead  of  the  status 
quo. 
Different  time  horizons  are  considered:  2015  and 
2022, to evaluate impacts both in the medium and the 
long  run.  In  this  paper,  only  2022  results  are 
presented. 
When  presenting  the  effects  of  EPAs  on  ACP 
countries‘ public finances we disentangle the overall 
outcome into three effects: a direct effect, due to tariff 
liberalisation; a trade diversion effect. 
III. CURRENT AND FUTURE TRADE POLICIES BETWEEN THE EU 
AND THE ACP COUNTRIES 
In  this  section  firstly  we  give  snapshopt  of  the 
protection applied and faced by ACP countries, using 
detrail tariff data (at HS6 level). Secondly we discuss 
the current and future trade policies between the EU   5 
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and  ACP  countries.  Finally  we  design  a  WTO 
compatible EPA, by optimizing the use of flexibility 
provided by the ‗substantially all trade‘ clause. 
A. Current protection pattern 
ACP regions apply different levels of protection to 
EU exports. CEMAC, COMESA and Pacific regions 
appear to be the most protective with an average duty 
of 13.5 percent and 12 percent, respectively. On the 
other hand, SADC and ECOWAS regions are the most 
liberal (7.1 percent and 8.1 percent). 
The  structure  of  tariffs  has  the  usual  shape  -  the 
highest level of protection is in agriculture, with peaks 
in  agrofood  (COMESA,  36  percent)  and  vegetable 
production  (Pacific,  56  percent).  In  manufacturing, 
CEMAC  and  SADC  still  protect  textiles  (for 
protectionist, but also for tariff revenue reasons) while 
COMESA  protects  the  metallurgic  sector.  Table  1 
displays the average rate of protection applied by ACP 
regions on EU and  ACP partners. The current ACP 
protection  structure  has  strong  negative  impacts  on 
other  ACP  regions,  due  to  the  latter‘s  sectoral 
specialisation. For SADC, the intra regional tariff is 
still around 15 percent, twice as high as that applied to 
EU exports to the region. Except for the CEMAC and 
the  Caribbean  areas,  important  gains  are  expected 
from the ACP countries‘ own regional integration. 
Regarding  the  EU trade  policy  towards  ACP,  the 
Cotonou agreement gives free access to all industrial 
products,  while  applying  some  protection  in 
agriculture.  Moreover,  ACP-LDCs  enjoy  duty  and 
quota  free  market  access  under  the  EU‘s  unilateral 
EBA  initiative  which  provides  market  access  to  all 
LDCs. More precisely in the case of EBA the phasing 
out of the last remaining quotas (Banana, Sugar and 
Rice) is currently on-going and will be completed by 
2009. 
 
Table 1: ACP average applied tariffs. Regional level. 
%  EC.  CE.  CO.  SA.  Carib.  Pac.  EU 
ECOWAS  4.0  4.2  7.5  7.3  5.2  6.0  8.1 
CEMAC  11.7  1.3  14.0  16.1  11.9  30.0  13.5 
COMESA  11.2  8.6  3.7  12.7  19.7  3.8  13.1 
SADC  8.7  10.3  9.6  14.6  3.3  36.4  7.1 
Carib.  1.0  0.1  14.0  1.3  0.3  14.0  9.5 
Pacific  8.8  16.2  9.2  5.5  12.0  40.9  12.0 
Source: Authors‘ computation based on MAcMapHS6v2. 
 
As shown in Table 2, our calculations indicate that 
some ACP countries still face an average tariff rate 
higher than that applied by the EU to imports from the 
Rest  of  the  World. The  aggregated  figure  presented 
here is affected by both the number of LDCs countries 
within each region and by the export composition of 
each  zone  in  relation  to  the  EU.  On  average,  ACP 
countries are strongly specialised in some agricultural 
products which are still highly protected in the EU.
3  
 
Table 2: Initial EU applied protection by sectors. 
%  EC.  CE.  CO.  SA.  Car.  Pac.  RoW 
Total  0.2  0.6  5.4  3.8  3.8  12.9  2.6 
Veg Prod.   1.0  6.1  13.8  48.2  13.9  20.0  10.8 
Livestocks  43.4  27.7  11.3  83.2  84.8  28.8  61.3 
Agr. Food 
 
0.1  0.1  0.1  0.6  0.1  8.5 
Primary 
           
0.4 
Elec. and Machinery 
     
1.8 
Metallurgy 
           
1.2 
Textile 
         
0.3  6.4 
Other Indus.  0.1 
 
0.7  0.4  0.1  0.4  1.7 
Source: Authors‘ computation based on MAcMapHS6v2. 
 
B. Trade policies between the EU and ACP countries 
Properly  speaking  the  European  Union  began  a 
cooperation  policy  with  the  African,  Caribbean  and 
Pacific (ACP) states as a whole in 1975. Until 2000 
these relations were governed by the regularly updated 
Lomé  Conventions.  The  economic  cooperation, 
implemented  through  a  system  of  trade  preferences, 
ensured  that  manufactured  and  agricultural  products 
(not in  direct competition  with  products covered  by 
the  common  agricultural  policy)  could  enter  the 
European  Community  without  being  subject  to 
customs  duties  or  quantitative  restrictions.  Most 
importantly, this access was on a non-reciprocal basis, 
in the sense that ACP states were merely requested to 
apply the most favoured  nation clause to the Union 
and to refrain from discriminating between countries 
of  the  Union.  Specific  regimes  were  applied  to 
products of extreme importance for ACP states such as 
sugar, beef and veal, rum and bananas. 
                                                            
3 This is the  case,  for example,  for developing countries in the 
SADC region where producers are disadvantaged by the high 
level of EU protection in tobacco and rice.   6 
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In the years running up to the expiration of the IV 
Lomé  convention,  ACP-EU  cooperation  faced 
pressures on several fronts. First, ACP countries felt 
that  the  principle  of  ‗equal  partnership‘  had  been 
eroded  and  replaced  by  a  relationship  based  on 
‗conditionality‘. Moreover, despite preferential access 
to  EU  markets,  ACP  export  performance  was 
deteriorating  over  time.  Finally  the  non-reciprocal 
preferential  trade  regime  provided  by  the  Lomé 
convention was increasingly seen as unacceptable and 
‗incompatible‘ with international trade rules. All these 
arguments highlighted the need for a re-appraisal of 
development cooperation in general and of ACP-EU 
cooperation and its trade elements in particular. 
The  new  Cotonou  Partnership  Agreement  was 
signed between the ACP countries and the European 
Union, on 23 June 2000 in Cotonou (Benin). It was 
concluded for a twenty-year period from March 2000 
to February 2020 with a clause for a mid-term review 
every five years.  
Major changes from the Lomé Conventions include 
the  strengthening  of  the  political  dimensions  of  the 
partnership, the deepening of the regional integration 
process between ACP countries, the preparation of a 
new  WTO  compatible  trade  policy  and  a  more 
rationalised  performance-based  aid  management. 
Accordingly, the driving force behind the EU‘s search 
for new trading arrangements was the need to ensure 
that future ACP-EU trade relations were compatible 
with  the  requirements  of  the  World  Trade 
Organization  (WTO),  specifically,  GATT  article 
XXIV.
4 
At the Fourth WTO ministerial conference in Doha 
in 2001, the EU was granted the most recent waiver 
for the Lomé conventions, allowing it to maintain the 
current  non  reciprocal  tariff  preferences  for  ACP 
countries until 31 December 2007. Negotiations for 
the so-called new Economic Partnership Agreements 
(hereafter  EPAs),  started  in  September  2002  and 
should be completed by 2007, to comply with the 
requirements of the waiver. 
                                                            
4  Article  XXIV,  provides  exceptions  to  MFN  treatment  for 
customs  unions  (CUs)  and  free-trade  areas.  In  particular  it 
requires  that,  in  free  trade  areas  and  customs  unions,  trade 
preferences are permitted only when duties and other restrictive 
regulations  are  eliminated  on  ‗substantially  all  the  trade‘ 
between the constituent territories. Thus preferences in an FTA 
have to be reciprocal. 
While on the one hand it is clear that reciprocity and 
free  trade  should  be  phased  in  progressively  and 
asymmetrically within the EPAs ―within a reasonable 
period of time‖, as required by GATT XXIV, on the 
other  hand  several  matters  remain  unclear.  For 
example, the interpretation of the ‗substantially all the 
trade‘  that  should  be  liberalised?  What  is  a 
―reasonable  period  of  time‖?  Or,  more  importantly, 
what will happen in the case that EPAs are not signed 
on time? 
Not all ACP countries face the same choices. ACP-
least  developed  countries  (LDCs)  will  still  benefit 
from  the  Everything  But  Arms  (EBA)  initiative 
whatever they decide to do. However LDCs need to 
compare alternatives including ‗variables‘ other than 
applied duties. The EPA negotiations may yield less 
restrictive rules of origin, for instance. In this case the 
gains associated with more favourable duties could be 
offset  by  more  elevated  administrative  costs,  or 
incapacity to meet origin requirements. 
The main problem arises with the non-LDCs ACP 
countries which are not in a position to enter an EPA 
and for whom ―alternative trade arrangements‖ have to 
be provided by 2008, once the Doha waiver for the 
current market access arrangements lapses. 
The  alternative  available  is  that  non-LDCs  ACP 
countries  avail  of  their  access  to  the  Generalized 
System of Preferences (GSP). Currently they already 
have  access  to  the  general  scheme  available  to  all 
developing countries (although rarely used as Cotonou 
preferences  are  usually  more  generous).  A  more 
attractive alternative would be the GSP-plus scheme, 
which  provides  improved  market  access  to 
―vulnerable‖ countries which show commitment to a 
sustainable approach to development by ratifying and 
implementing a series of international conventions. 
Although, on the one hand, this solution would be 
fully WTO compatible, as the GSP is legally justified 
under the Enabling Clause, on the other side, it will 
not grant to the ACP the same level of preferences that 
they  currently  enjoy.  Both  the  GSP  and  GSP  plus 
provide for a less favourable treatment. 
Table  3  displays  the  impact  in  terms  of  average 
tariff  applied  by  the  EU  to  ACP  exports  if  ACP 
countries were to move from Cotonou preferences to 
those  provided  by  either  GSP  or  GSP+  (EBA  for 
LDCs). All regions will suffer, but the impact varies   7 
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depending on the number of LDCs in the group and 
the  structure  of  exports.  Even  for  ECOWAS  and 
CEMAC, which export mainly raw products that tend 
to have low or zero MFN tariffs (oil, cocoa, cotton), 
the  effects  are  still  visible.  They  move  from  an 
average tariff of close to zero to 1.7 percent and 2.8 
percent  respectively.  Moreover,  tariff  escalation  will 
become  an  issue,  with  a  jump  of  protection  for 
processed products from zero to 6 percent on average. 
The  Caribbean  and  Pacific  regions  will  also  see 
strong impacts from the reduction in their preferential 
margins on sugar and bananas, key exports from both 
regions. For COMESA, moving to GSP would more 
than double its average tariff rate (from 5.4 to 13.7 
percent).  Overall,  the  difference  between  GSP  and 
GSP plus is not significant, except in Eastern Africa.
5 
 
Table 3: Average protection rates when moving from Cotonou 
to GSP and GSP+. 
Regions  Cotonou  GSP  GSP+ 
ECOWAS+  0.2%  1.7%  1.7% 
CEMAC+  0.6%  2.9%  2.8% 
COMESA  5.4%  13.7%  11.9% 
SADC  3.8%  4.5%  4.3% 
Caribbean  3.8%  16.3%  15.9% 
Pacific  12.9%  27.6%  27.2% 
RoW  2.6%  2.6%  2.6% 
Source: Authors‘ computation based on MAcMapHS6v2. 
 
C. EPAs: designing a WTO compatible agreement 
As already mentioned, EPAs have to satisfy Article 
XXIV of the GATT. Among other things, this means 
that  the  desire  of  most  ACP  countries  to  maintain 
some tariffs for protectionist and tax reasons can, to 
some  extent,  be  fulfilled.  However  to  determine  to 
what  extent  this  will  be  possible  it  is  important  to 
consider what ‗substantially all trade‘ would mean for 
them  in  terms  of  share  of  trade  to  be  liberalised. 
Concerning this point we have followed the guidelines 
of the European Commission, which considers that a 
                                                            
5  This  is  due  to  the  fact  that  several  countries  in  the  region, 
especially  Mauritius,  are  significant  exporters  in  the  textiles 
sector,  where  GSP  plus  eliminates  protection,  while  GSP 
provides only limited advantages. As GSP plus does not cover 
either sugar or bananas its impact on the tariffs applied to other 
regions is limited. 
PTA  is  WTO  compatible  if  90  percent  of  bilateral 
trade is fully liberalized. 
Assuming full liberalization from the EU side, this 
would imply a liberalization of 80 percent of the ACP 
imports if trade flows were balanced. However, when 
implementing  this  criterion  at  the  regional  level, 
important  differences  appear.  Indeed,  depending  on 
the extent to which ACP regions display negative or 
positive  trade  balances  with  the  EU,  the  extent  of 
liberalisation  of  imports  required  to  meet  the  90 
percent  target  will  naturally  vary.  For  instance  the 
Pacific region, which exports much more to the EU 
than  it  imports  (distance  effect),  could  potentially 
shelter up to 42 percent of its original imports and still 
cover  90  percent  of  trade.  On  the  contrary,  for  the 
Caribbean region, which has a negative trade balance 
with the EU, the share of the excluded imports would 
represent  less  than  20  percent.  For  other  regions, 
ECOWAS  will  be  entitled  to  exclude  21%  of  its 
imports  originating  in  the  EU,  CEMAC  23%, 
COMESA 19% and SADC 25%. 
On the issue of timing, we assume that the EPA will 
be implemented over a period of 15 years. However to 
reflect  the  asymmetry  between  partners,  the  EU  is 
assumed to grant free access to all ACP exports by 
2008.  Even  if  such  a  choice  would  exceed  the 
recommendation  of  the  article  XXIV:5,  it  could  be 
easily  justified  due  to  the  specific  weaknesses  of 
African  countries  and  the  number  of  LDCs  among 
them. 
A last question remains: how do we select sensitive 
products?  Two  approaches  have  been  chosen, 
following  guidelines  provided  by  EU  Commission‘s 
DG Trade experts. 
H1  Scenario:  in  this  scenario,  priority  for 
protection is given to agricultural products. 
Agricultural  products  are  selected  first  for 
exclusion. After these products are ruled out, the most 
sensitive manufactured products (identified here as the 
ones contributing the most to tariff revenues) are also 
excluded, up to the overall level of residual protection 
assumed  to  be  acceptable.  Adopting  such  strategy 
would not optimise the choice of products in order to 
minimise the losses in tariff revenues, but in this way 
we reflect the political sensitivity of the agricultural 
sector in most ACP countries. The ranking inside this 
category  is  given  by  the  theoretical  value  of  tariff   8 
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revenue  (Imports  from  the  EU  x  tariff).  All 
computations are made at the regional level, adding up 
national effects by product.  
H2 Scenario: in this scenario, the objective is to 
reduce  tariff revenue  losses  at the  regional level. A 
discrete  choice  model  has  been  built  to  ensure  that 
products  are  chosen  in  a  way  that  minimises  tariff 
losses, at initial trade level, subject to two constraints: 
the  share  of  excluded  trade  should  not  exceed  the 
amount  allowed  and  the  number  of  products  in  the 
regional list should not be above 20 percent of total 
tariff lines. 
Due to the different approaches, products contained 
in  the  exclusion  lists  vary  considerably:  agricultural 
products  under  H1,  manufacturing  goods  (e.g.  cars, 
used clothes) under H2. 
The  consequences  of  the  exclusion  lists  are 
displayed  in  Table  4.  The  result  is  far  from  full 
liberalisation.  Due  to  the  extensive  list  of  excluded 
products  which  the  Pacific  region  could  potentially 
include,  the  effects  of  liberalisation  are  completely 
neutralised in that region. Other regions could retain 
between one-fifth and half of their initial protection. 
Obviously,  since  the  H2  scenario  is  aimed  at 
protecting  tariff  revenue,  the  better  outcome  is 
achieved  under  this  approach.  Under  this  second 
option,  COMESA  could  still  keep  half  of  its  initial 
level of protection by excluding just 19 percent of EU 
imports from liberalisation. 
 









ECOWAS+  8.1%  1.5%  3.6% 
CEMAC+  13.5%  3.8%  6.4% 
COMESA  13.1%  4.8%  6.7% 
SADC  7.1%  2.9%  4.4% 
Caribbean  9.5%  3.1%  4.1% 
Pacific  12.0%  12.0%  11.9% 
Source: Authors‘ computation. 
 
IV. THE MODEL THE DATA SOURCES AND THE EXPERIMENT 
DESIGN 
In this section we firstly describe the structure of 
the model. Major caveats are highlighted in order to 
enable the reader to properly interpret the results. The 
model‘s equations are available upon request. Data are 
described  in  a  second  sub-section.  In  follows  a 
discussion on the employed calibration procedure. At 
last,  we  conclude  with  a  discussion  of  the  scenario 
simulated  and  the  choice  of  the  relevant 
counterfactual, namely the status-quo versus GSP. 
A. The Model 
The  quantitative  study  of  the  impact  of  EPAs  is 
therefore  performed  using  a  dynamic  partial 
equilibrium  model,  expressly  built  for  this  purpose. 
The model, which is based on usual assumptions of 
partial equilibrium analysis has been designed to allow 
a very detailed evaluation of the impact on trade and 
government  budgets  of  the  ongoing  EPA 
negotiations.
6 
Regional income, which is assumed to be fixed, is 
allocated among different  HS6-products  (5,113 HS6 
products) using a system of nested CES functions (the 
demand nesting is shown in Figure 1). 
More precisely, at the first stage consumers have to 
arbitrate between two main categories   of products: 
agricultural (AgroAgri) and industrial (OtherInd). 
Here we assume a complementarity between the 
two (Leontieff preferences). Then, the   total demand 
for each category is allocated between different sectors  
with a weak substitution DTotCat = 0.8). For instance in 
the  case  of  the  main  category  AgroAgri  we  have 
considered  three  sub-sectors:  Agro-food  (AgroF), 
Vegetables (Veg) and Animal (Anim) products. The 
consumption  of  these  large  sectors  are  splitted 
between between GTAP-defined sectors (see Hertel & 
Tsigas, 1999 [4]), with an elasticity of substitution of 
0.95. 
The  last  stage  of  product  disaggregation  will  go 
from the GTAP level to the HS6 nomenclature (DHS6 
=  1.5).  The  choice  made  on  the  elasticity  of 
substitutions,  (0.8, 0.95,  1.5), reflects the  will to  be 
transparent  and  systematic.  Moreover,  increasing 
substitutability  with  the  level  of  disaggregation 
appears to be a sounded assumption even if the exact 
level of substitution is difficult to define. 
                                                            
6 Some of them are quite suitable to the situation, such as the fixed 
exchange rate assumption due to the existence of the CFA franc 
zone.   9 
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Figure 1: Demand tree 
 
 
As  far  as  consumption  choices  within  each  HS6 
category  are  concerned,  we  make  use  of  a  nested 
Armington ―assumption‖ (Armington, 1969). Without 
excessive complexity, it allows the particular status of 
domestic goods, together with product differentiation 
according  to  geographical  origin  and  horizontal 
product differentiation between varieties to be taken 
into account. The last point is crucial in the context of 
EPAs once in most of the cases, EU products are not 
in direct competition with the ACP ones (Fontagné et 
al., 2008 [3]). 
More  precisely,  for  every  HS6  product,  a  CES 
(GEOHS6)  allocates  the  demand  between  goods 
originated  in  countries  with  the  same  level  of 
development  and  goods  originated  in  countries  of  a 
different  category.  Then,  DU  is  distributed  between 
local  variety  and  imported  ones  thanks  to  a  CES 
function with an elasticity of substitution ARMHS6. A 
last  stage  is  added  to  define  the  exact  origin  of 
products  across  similar  countries  group  (CES  with 
IMPUHS6). On the other side, DV is distributed across 
different  importers  using  a  CES  with  an  elasticity 
IMPVHS6. To have a consistent tree, we need to have 
GEOHS6 > ARMHS6 >IMPVHS6 and GEOHS6 > IMPUHS6, 
e.g.  for  an  ACP  country,  a  products  will  be  more 
substitutable  with  other  ACP  countries  (included  in 
DU) than with the EU (included in DV). 
This framework is also suitable to see how the EPA 
could  affect  the  regional  integration  process  by 
diverting intra ACP trade.   10 
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Since, the choice of product origins is made at the 
HS6  level,  we  would  have  needed  Armington 
elasticities at this level even if we have only access to 
elasticities at the GTAP level, drawn from the GTAP 
database.  At  the  HS6  level  only  import  demand 
elasticities  are  available  for  a  number  of  countries, 
thanks to the estimation provided by the World Bank 
(Kee et al., 2004 [7]). However, the structural form of 
the model (nested CES) gives a relation between all 
elasticities  and  particularly  between  direct  price 
elasticities  and  elasticities  of  substitution.  So,  we 
calibrate  elasticities  at  the  product  level  in  order  to 
match  Armington  elasticities  of  substitution  at  the 
GTAP level and direct price elasticities computed by 
the World Bank at the HS6 level. To avoid unrealistic 
results from the simulations, we limit GEOHS6 in the 
range [1.1, 8], ARMUHS6 to [1.05, 8] and we assume 
IMPUHS6  =  Min(2  ARMHS6,  12),  IMPVHS6  =  Min(2 
ARMHS6, 12). 
This  partial  equilibrium  model  focuses  on  the 
demand  side.  The  supply  side  is  assumed  to  be 
perfectly adjustable and so, the elasticity of supply is 
equal to infinity. This means that production prices are 
constant  over  all  scenarios,  while  consumer  prices 
follow the changes in product taxes, in this case tariffs. 
As a result of this assumption, volume changes and 
value changes of producer prices will be the same for 
all the results presented. 
This  assumption,  while  realistic  for  the  EU  side, 
may seem crude for ACP countries. Indeed the EU‘s 
production capacity would have no problem adapting 
to the forecast shifts in demand within the ACP. Even 
if their demand were to double, it would never exceed 
1  percent  of  EU  production.  In  contrast,  ACP 
countries  suffer  severe  capacity  constraints  when 
adapting to changes in demand. 
The main consequence of these hypothesises on our 
results  have  several  consequences.  We  overestimate 
the effects on the EU exports (in volume) from ACP 
liberalisation, since ACP producers would not reduce 
their  price  to  face  increasing  competition.  We 
overestimate the effects of EU liberalisation on ACP 
exports (in volume) as we assume that they have no 
supply constraints. 
Consequently,  forecast  increases  in  ACP  exports 
should be interpreted as potential gains. To transform 
them into real gains, specific policies would have to be 
set up to support production in the sectors where the 
highest increases are forecast. In this way bottleneck 
effects could be avoided. 
B. Data Sources 
Even  setting  our  analysis  in  a  partial  equilibrium 
framework,  our  model  requires  very  detailed  data 
which  unfortunately  is  not  always  available.  So  we 
have to make some key assumptions for missing data. 
For trade data, we make use of a number of sources 
in  order  to  complete  missing  information,  notably 
concerning  African  countries‘  trade.  Specifically  we 
employ  COMEXT  (source  Eurostat)  for  EU-ACP 
relations  and  BACI  (CEPII‘s  database,  which  is  a 
harmonized  trade  database  based  on  UN-
COMTRADE)  for  all  the  other  importers.  Many 
weaknesses  remain  on  intra-African  trade  flows, 
bringing a lot of uncertainty to any exercise focusing 
on intra-African trade relations (e.g. a deep regional 
integration process). To reduce the annual volatility in 
trade data as much as possible we calibrate the model 
using a mean figure based on three years (2002-2004). 
Tariff  data  for  the  year  2004  are  obtained  from 
MAcMAp-v2 (CEPII). Both the ad valorem tariffs and 
Tariff-Rate-Quotas are considered. An addendum has 
been  made  to  take  account  of  the  recent  EU  GSP 
reform. 
Due  to  the  crucial  role  of  sugar  and  bananas,  in 
ACP  exports  and  preferential  treatment,  a  specific 
approach has been adopted for these two products. We 
accurately  calibrate  the  equivalent  marginal  rate  of 
protection  faced  by  each  country,  given  their 
production costs. Indeed, due to the quota system and 
a  strong  variation  in their  production  structures,  the 
same change in the rate of protection (moving from 
the Cotonou regime to GSP, or preference erosion as a 
result of the DDA) will not have the same impact on 
all of the ACP countries. 
As in reality government never receives 100 percent 
of their theoretical tariff duty receipts (computed as 
the sum of the official tariff rates multiplied by the 
import  values)we  decided  to  adopt  an  optimistic 
assumption: an average collection rate of 80 percent 
for developing countries and 60 percent for LDCs.24 
To  include  the  share  of  domestic  production  in 
domestic consumption for agriculture we used highly 
disaggregated data compiled by the FAO. We employ   11 
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this data to calibrate the initial market share of local 
and  imported  HS6  products.  Whenever  data  at  this 
level is not available or inaccurate, we determine this 
proportion from the GTAP 6.2 database, making the 
assumption  that  the  same  share  holds  at  the  most 
disaggregated level. For the industry sectors, detailed 
data are available from UNIDO, but only for a small 
number of countries. Consequently we decided to rely 
on  the  same  assumption  made  in  the  case  of  non-
accessible agricultural data (i.e. based on the GTAP 
database). 
Finally  the  model  structure  requires  values  for 
several  elasticities,  namely  elasticity  of  substitution 
between products from the most aggregated level to 
HS6  (industrial  and  agricultural  goods,  meat  and 
vegetables,  poultry  meat  and  pork  meat)  and  across 
geographical  origins.  At  the  HS6  level  only  import 
demand  elasticities  are  available  for  many  countries 
thanks  to  the  estimations  performed  by  the  World 
Bank  (Kee  et  al.,  2004).  The  only  other  reliable 
estimates are provided by the GTAP 6.2 database, at 
the  GTAP  sectoral  level.  A  specific  calibration 
procedure  is  applied  to  jointly  determine  the  other 
substitution  elasticities  used  in  the  model.  With  our 
calibration  method  we  maintain  coherence  between 
the  initial  levels  of  consumption,  the  Armington 
elasticities  at  the  GTAP  level  and  the  demand 
elasticities for the HS6 products. 
C. Experiment design 
Two main scenarios have been simulated, differing 
in the choice of ‗sensitive products‘. First, the end of 
Cotonou, successful EPA negotiations with full duty-
free, quota-free access for ACP countries to the EU 
and the liberalisation of ACP imports under the H1 
scenario  (sensitive  products  are  not  liberalised  and 
they are concentrated in agriculture). H1 would be our 
central scenario when presenting the results. Then, a 
second scenario, with the same baseline, the same EU 
policy  but  the  H2  scenario  for  ACP  countries 
(sensitive  products  are  not  liberalised  and  they  are 
chosen in order to reduce fiscal losses at the regional 
level). 
In  both  cases,  we  assume  that  the  complete 
implementation of the EPAs by the ACP countries will 
be staggered over 15 years. From 2008 to 2015, a cut 
of 20% is applied to customs duty on the non-sensitive 
products imported from the EU; while the complete 
elimination on these products is achieved in 2022. In 
addition to the liberalisation process, we also deepen 
the  trade  integration  within  each  negotiating  block. 
More  precisely,  we  assume  that  each  region  will 
become a free trade area in 2015. As for the EU, it 
gives free access to all ACP products in 2008. 
D. Choosing the right counterfactual: different options 
The  debate  addressing  the  consequences  of  the 
EPAs  is  often  based  on  irrelevant  assumptions.  In 
particular the alternative to the EPAs is not the status 
quo.  In  the  context  of  the  WTO  waiver,  there  is  a 
commitment  to  move  towards  WTO  compatibility. 
That  means  either  FTAs,  or,  in  their  absence,  ACP 
countries  would  go  back  to  the  situation  of  other 
developing economies in the WTO. 
LDCs  are  already  eligible  for  EBA  preferences. 
This alternative is therefore the next best option for 
them. The rest of the ACP countries would have to go 
back to preferences provided under the GSP scheme, 
which  means  a  considerable  downgrading  of  their 
preferential access. 
Alternatively, a limited number of ACP countries 
could envisage claiming the benefit of the GSP+. 
Therefore  EPAs  gains  and  losses,  in  terms  of 
exports, imports or tariff revenues must be assessed, 
not in comparison with the current situation, but rather 
with an alternative situation corresponding to reduced 
preferential access. 
 
Table 5: The cost of not-signing an EPA. Regional results,with full 
implementation of EBA. (Exports (to EU) volume changes, %) 
Regions  GSP  GSP+ 
All ACP  -4.9  -3.5 
ECOWAS+  -2.6  -2.5 
CEMAC+  -4.1  -3.9 
COMESA  -12.1  -5.1 
SADC  -1.6  -1.4 
Caribbean  -9.1  -7.2 
Pacific  -8.4  -7 
Source: Simulations results 
 
We begin with the situation in 2004 and then we 
move  to  2007.  From  this  starting  point  we  perform 
two alternative reference scenarios. We first simulate 
the  case  in  which  at  the  end  of  2007  EPA  is  not   12 
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signed,  in  other  words  EBA  applied  for  LDCs 
(including  the  removal  of  the  last  restrictions  for 
sugar, rice and bananas in 2009) and GSP for non-
LDCs  ACP.  We  will  use  this  as  the  reference 
situation.  Alternatively  we  consider  the  combination 
of EBA for LDCs and GSP+ for non-LDCs ACP. 
The trade and budgetary impact of EPAs would be 
presented as a deviation from the reference situation in 
the next section.  
Considering the first option (EBA for ACP LDCs 
and GSP for the remaining ACP countries), the loss of 
preferences associated with the lapsing of the Cotonou 
scheme would result in a fall of 4.8 percent in ACP 
exports to the EU. For COMESA, the Caribbean and 
the  Pacific  countries  the  reduction  would  be  even 
sharper, reaching 12 percent for the former (table 5). 
The second option, providing GSP+ preferences to all 
non LDC ACP countries, seems to have little impact 
compared to the more general GSP scheme. A positive 
impact is seen only for the COMESA region, due to 
the more  favourable treatment of textile products in 
the GSP+. 
 
Table 6: The cost of not-signing an EPA. Sectoral results,with full 
implementation of EBA. (Exports (to EU) volume changes, %) 
Sectors  GSP  GSP+ 
Total  -5  -3.5 
Vegetal Prod.  -10.7  -10.2 
Livestocks  -30  -29.9 
Agr. Food  -13.8  -12.3 
Primary  0  0 
Metallurgy  -2.1  -2.1 
Elec. and Machienery  -0.3  0 
Textile  -27.7  -0.4 
Other Industries  -2.1  -1.6 
Sugar-Banana  -54.2  -54.2 
Source: Simulations results 
 
The  sectoral  impact  of  our  reference  scenario  is 
illustrated  in  Table  6.  Losses  are  concentrated  in 
products associated with specific protocols: sugar and 
bananas (55 percent), which also explains the difficult 
situation of the Caribbean countries. It is worth noting 
that for sugar the impact of the EU‘s domestic reform 
is  not  directly  considered  here.  However  the 
consequent fall in the sugar price in the EU market 
will reduce the preferential margins granted to ACP 
countries in any case. Other products strongly affected 
are livestock (with a 30 percent fall in exports) and 
textiles  (-27  percent).  For  the  latter,  under  GSP+ 
losses are cancelled out. 
V. ASSESSING THE IMPACTS OF EPAS 
This  section  is  devoted  to  the  analysis  of  the 
forecast trade and fiscal impacts of EPAs. 
A. The trade impact of EPAs 
In  this  subsection  we  examine  the  impact  of  the 
EPAs, using as the counterfactual the combination of 
EBA for LDC ACP countries and GSP for non-LDCs 
ACP countries. As indicated in table 8 we forecast a 
10.7 percent increase in the volume of ACP exports to 
the  EU  in  2022  under  an  EPA  scenario.  This 
percentage  is  calculated  in  comparison  with  the 
benchmark  scenario:  GSP  and  EBA.  If  we  were  to 
consider the current situation as a benchmark, signing 
EPAs would have led to a more limited gain of 5.4 
percent  ((1.107*0.952)-1).  Hence  we  see  the 
importance of using the correct benchmark if we wish 
to accurately access likely impacts. All in all, we can 
conclude that ACP exports to the EU are forecast to be 
10.7 percent higher with EPAs than in their absence 
and 5.4 percent higher than is currently the case. These 
figures  refer  to  the  scenario  in  which  a  multilateral 
agreement  has  not  been  reached.  Under  the 
assumption of the simultaneous successful completion 
of the Doha Round, the margins of preferences on the 
EU market associated with EPAs, would be eroded. 
Hence, export gains would be slightly reduced for all 
ACP  regions.  With  or  without  an  agreement  at 
multilateral level in the immediate future, preference 
erosion  is  unavoidable  over  time.  Nevertheless  the 
EPAs will provide a temporary advantage in terms of 
market access, particularly for the livestock sector. 
Finally, we should keep in mind that increases in 
exports will not translate into equivalent changes in 
the ACP trade balance, since imports from the EU will 
also be liberalised  with  consequent changes in their 
trade flows. This is particularly true for the 2022 time 
horizon. In 2015, only 20 percent of the liberalisation 
of  ACP  countries  in  relation  to  EU imports  will  be 
achieved, while full access will be provided to the EU   13 
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market.  Accordingly,  a  transitory  gain  for  the  trade 
balance of ACP countries is expected over the period. 
 
Table 7: Trade consequences for ACP regions by region. Volume 







All ACP  10.7  17.7 
ECOWAS+  4  15.1 
CEMAC+  7.3  17.2 
COMESA  25.5  20.7 
SADC  6.6  10.6 
Caribbean  25.2  27.1 
Pacific  37.1  -0.2 
Source: Simulations results 
 
Table 8: Trade consequences for ACP regions by sector. Volume 







Total  10.7  17.7 
Vegetal Prod.  41.4  0.8 
Livestocks  143.9  0.6 
Agr. Food  16.9  3.6 
Primary  0  26.1 
Metallurgy  2.1  27.6 
Elec. And Machienery  0.3  19.5 
Textile  38.3  36.8 
Other Industries  8.1  13.9 
Source: Simulations results 
 
The  sectoral  breakdown  of  these  forecast  export 
gains is detailed in Table 8. In percentage terms, the 
largest gains would accrue to exporters in the livestock 
sector, where exports are forecast to increase by 140 
percent.
7  Exports of vegetable products and textiles 
are  also  forecast  to  increase  significantly,  by  40 
percent. The completion of the Doha Round would be 
particularly detrimental to these forecast gains in the 
textiles sector. The relatively high MFN tariffs which 
still  exist  in  textiles  in  the  EU,  will  be  reduced. 
Consequently  the  value  of  preferences  given  to 
developing countries will also shrink. 
                                                            
7Non tariff barriers are not considered here. They may limit this 
potential  increase,  as  may  the  existing  supply  capacities.  These 
results should therefore be seen as potential increases in exports 
given the existing trade pattern. 
Turning  to  imports  (see  Table  7  an  average  17.7 
percent increase in ACP imports is forecast for ACP 
countries  in  2022.  Note  that  this  percentage  applies 
both to the current situation and to the benchmark, as 
no difference between the two exists in terms of EU 
access to ACP markets. This outcome corresponds to a 
situation where liberalisation is fully achieved. When 
considering the 2015 horizon, the increase in the ACP 
imports  from  the  EU  is  forecast  to  be  limited  to  7 
percent. This smaller percentage is explained by the 
limited liberalisation of ACP imports over this time 
horizon. Once again, the Caribbean is the region most 
affected, with a forecast increase in EU imports of 27 
percent. The SADC region is at the opposite of the 
spectrum with imports forecast to increase by only 11 
percent. 
The sectoral composition of these import increases 
(see Table  8)  points to a concentration in industrial 
goods (particularly textiles) and primary products. The 
increase  is  negligible  in  agriculture.  All  in  all,  the 
composition  of  respective  changes  in  exports  and 
imports mirrors the traditional trade specialisation of 
Europe  and  the  ACP,  with  the  latter  specialised  in 
agriculture  and  the  former  in  industrial  goods.  The 
exception is textiles, where exports and imports will 
both increase;  this  might  be  explained  by  a  vertical 
division  of  labour  (with  ACP  countries  importing 
intermediate products from the EU) takes place. 
B. The impact of excluding products 
Two issues which are amongst the most contentious in 
the  EPA  debate  are  the  percentage  of  products  to  be 
excluded  from  liberalisation  (on  the  ACP  side),  and  the 
choice of these excluded products. As already pointed out 
we  selected  sensitive  products  following  two  different 
methods. 
Under  scenario  H1,  priority  is  given  to  the 
exclusion  of  agricultural  products,  while  under 
scenario H2 we minimize tariff revenue losses. 
We  can  see  from  Table  10  that  the  alternative 
assumption  (H2),  optimally  choosing  tariff  lines  in 
order  to  secure  tariff  revenues,  would  efficiently 
protect sensitive products, while limiting the increase 
in imports. 
The results presented in the left part are averages, 
which  clearly  hide  tremendous  differences  in  the 
expected  impacts  of  the  alternative  choices  of  the   14 
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exclusions  at  the  sectoral  level.  For  instance  a 
manufactured  sector  with  tariff  peaks  will  have 
numerous  products  excluded  using  H2;  while  using 
H1 largely protects agricultural products. The last two 
columns illustrate the impacts at sectoral level. Under 
H2, the surge in ACP imports of textile products from 
the  EU  would  be  curbed:  they  would  be  five  times 
lower  than  under  scenario  H1.  On  the  contrary, 
imports of vegetable products, livestock and agrifood 
would  increase  more  under  H2.  Reducing  potential 
increases in imports is not the only issue. Whenever 
imports are also industrial inputs, restraining them and 
making them more expensive could have a negative 
impact in terms of overall competitiveness. 
Unfortunately the structure of the model does not 
permit us to address this issue. 
 
Table 10: The role of the exclusion list on regional imports. 
ACP  Import  volume  from  the  EU,  regional  and  sectoral 
breakdown. (%, Change) 
Regions  H1  H2  Sectors  H1  H2 
All ACP  17.7  13.1  Total  17.7  13.1 
ECOWAS+  15.1  10.3  Vegetal Prod.  0.8  8 
CEMAC+  17.2  12.6  Livestocks  0.6  12.1 
COMESA  20.7  16  Agr. Food  3.6  7 
SADC  10.6  6.6  Primary  26.1  21.4 
Caribbean  27.1  22.5  Metallurgy  27.6  14.9 
Pacific  -0.2  1  Elec. and Machienery  19.5  14.7 
 
Textile  36.8  7.3 
Other Industries  13.9  9.3 
Source: Simulations results. 
 
C. Impacts on tariff and government revenues 
The effects of EPAs on the ACPs‘ public finances 
have  been  widely  debated.  However  the  different 
impacts have rarely been disentangled. 
For  the  elimination  of  customs  duties  on  many 
European duties we identify two main effects: a direct 
effect  and  a  trade  diversion  effect.  Concerning  the 
first, the overall effect of cutting tariffs will depend on 
the  combination  of  both  reducing  tariffs  and  the 
increase in imports as a result of falling import prices, 
until liberalisation is complete. However we observe 
that the direct effect is always negative, which means 
that the impact on the fall in duty is always larger than 
that of the increase in volumes. 
A  second  effect  of  the  EPAs  is  trade  diversion, 
expected from any FTA. Here, untaxed imports from 
the EU - or from countries belonging to the same ACP 
region - will replace currently taxed imports from the 
rest  of  the  world.  Accordingly,  trade  diversion 
provides additional negative impacts, in addition to the 
direct effects. 
 






% of tariff revenue 












All ACP  1390  1970  467  569  -71  -19 
ECOWAS  530  648  172  178  -82  -27 
CEMAC  246  345  27  32  -71  -30 
COMESA  297  478  128  160  -62  -16 
SADC  91  157  49  51  -58  -16 
Caribbean  226  337  84  137  -67  -13 
Pacific  0  5  7  11  -1  -9 
Source: Simulations results. 
 
Trade  diversion  is  illustrated  in  Table  10  where 
fiscal losses are displayed for scenario H1 as well as 
an hypothetical full liberalisation scenario between the 
EU  and  the  ACP  countries.  As  the  combination  of 
both effects the average loss of tariff revenue on EU 
imports  for  all  ACP  is  forecast to  be 71  percent  in 
2022 (702 millions of 2004 euros). The lowest losses 
are forecast in the SADC region (58 percent), while 
the  region  most  heavily  affected  is  forecast  to  be 
ECOWAS, for which the trade diversion effect would 
be particularly detrimental (losses of 700 millions of 
euros annually in the long run or 82 percent of the 
tariff revenue in 2022). 
However,  this  threat  needs  to  be  viewed  in  the 
wider context. First, as we have seen above, EPAs will 
not be fully fledged FTAs, in that there will not be 100 
percent symmetric liberalisation between the parties. 
Tariff  revenue  will  continue  to  be  collected  on  EU 
imports,  as  a  certain  number  of  products  can  be 
excluded from tariff cuts. As displayed in Table 10, 
the total losses for the ACP under scenario H1 is only 
73% of the fiscal cost of a full FTA. 
Moreover, the European Union is not the only trade 
partner  for  ACP  countries.  They  still  collect  tariff 
revenue  on  most  third  countries  imports:  if  the 
scenario H1 reduces the tariff revenue collected on EU   15 
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export by 71%, it is just a 19% decline in total tariff 
revenue for these countries. 
Last, if ACP objective is to minimise tariff revenue 
losses  on  EU  products,  scenario  H2  becomes  more 
relevant.  In  this  case,  tariff  losses  are  drastically 
results: from 71% to 52% for all ACP regions (-82% 
to -57% for ECOWAS, -58%.to -37% for SADC). 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This  article  provide  a  detail  assessment  of  the 
market access component of the EPA between the EU 
and  the  6  ACP  regions. Our  analysis  is  based  on a 
partial  equilibrium  mode  at  the  HS6  level  (5113 
products)  for  the  EU25  and  60  ACP  countries. 
Realistic  EPA  scenarios  are  built  assuming  partial 
liberalisation  of  ACP  regions  in  respect  of  GATT 
article XXIV. ACP exports to the EU are forecast to 
be  10  percent  higher  with  the  EPAs than  under  the 
GSP/EBA  option.  On  average  ACP  countries  are 
forecast to lose 70 percent of tariff revenues on EU 
imports  in  the  long  run.  Yet  imports  from  other 
regions  of  the  world  will  continue  to  provide  tariff 
revenues.  Thus  when  tariff  revenue  losses  are 
computed on total ACP imports, losses are limited to 
26  percent  on average  in the long  run and even  19 
percent when the product lists are optimised. The final 
impact on the economy depends on the importance of 
tariffs  in  government  revenue  and  on  potential 
compensatory effects. However this long term and less 
visible effect will mainly depend on the capacity of 
each ACP country to reorganise its fiscal base. 
Finally for the last point it is clear that the effects of 
EPAs on the ACPs‘ public finances will be different 
across countries depending on the initial importance of 
tariff  revenue  in  total  government  income.  For 
instance,  Congo,  where  tariff  revenue  losses  are 
forecast to be high,(almost a third) depends relatively 
little  on  this  source  of  revenue  (7.1%).  However 
several West African countries, like Ghana and to a 
greater  extent  the  Ivory  Cost,  which  are  heavily 
dependent for their budget on this revenue, may  go 
through  difficult  transition  phases  due  to  heavy 
predicted losses in customs receipts. In this context, it 
will be important for the negotiators to concentrate on 
these latter types of countries. The absolute values of 
customs revenue losses computed in this study give a 
clear  picture  of  the  financial  requirements  for  the 
implementation of such a program. 
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